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ABSTRACT
Three surveys ofexchange rate expectations allow usto measure
directlythe expected rates of return on yen versus dollars. Expectations
of yen appreciation against the dollar have been Cl) consistently large,
(2) variable, and(3)greaterthan the forward premium,implyingthat
investorswere willing to accept a lower expectedreturn on dollarassets.
Atshort—term horizons expectations exhibit bandwagon effects, while at
longer—term horizons they show the reverse. A 10 percent yen appreciation
generates the expectation of a further appreciation of 2.11 percent over the
following week, for example, but a depreciation of 3.1$ percent over the
following year. At any horizon, investors would do better to reduce the
absolute magnitude of expected depreciation. The true spot rate process
behaves more like a random walk.
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With most of Japan's restrictions on international capital flows
recently removed, the yen is now properly thought of as subject to the
asset—market model of exchange rates: the demand foryenversus dollars
respondsinstantaneously to.the expected rates of return on the two assets.
The most evident component ofvariation in recent years has been interest
rates.The difrerentiai. betweenU.S. and Japanese interest rates can be
usedtoexplain the increased demand for dollars andthesharp appreciation
ofthe dollar against the yen from 1979 to 198I1, andthesubsequent
reversal in 1985.B6.2 But the other major determinant of theexpected
return differential, the expected rate of future appreciationof the yen,
ismuch less easily observed than interest rates.
One view isthatthe expected rate of depreciation can be
measured by the discount in the forward market. According to this view,
1Thispaper was writtenwhile the authors were participantsat the National
Bureau of Economic Research 1986 Suer Institute and while they were
Visiting Scholarsat the International Finance Division, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. Washington, D.C. 20551. They would like to
thank in additIon to these institutes, the Sloan Foundation, the Institute
of Business anc Economic Research at U.C. Berkeley. and the National
Science Founcation (under grant no. SES-8218300) for research support.
Views exvresseo are those of the authors. Alldataused in this paper are-
availablefrom Ken Ft-oct. Sloan School of Management. HIT, Cambridge. HA 02fl9.
2Manypaoers dI9cuss the roleof the interest rates in deterninin the
yen/dollar exc-ange rate, es:ecially since the 1979—80 liberalization.
Four examples are Amano Y95), Ishiyama (1955), Ito (1986), and Johnson
and Loopesko (1956).—2—
the3 per cent yen—dollarforward discountthat prevailedin the early
19805represented investors' expectations that the dollar would in the
future depreciate, presumably back toward some equilibrium level. An
implication is that investors acting on this expectation — "speculators"
— had a lower demand for dollars during the strong—dollarperiodthan they
would have had acting solelyonthe basisof theinterest differçntialor
otherfactors;in other words, speculation was stabilizing.
Analternativeview is that the expected rate of depreciation is
muchcloser to zero than to the forward discount. Many empirical studies
have found that the rationally, or mathematically, expected rate pt
depreciation is close to zero, (i.e., thattheexchange rate follows a
random walk) so.there is a prima facie case that the same is true of
investor expectations. If expected depreciation is zero ("static
expectations"), then there is no stabilizing effect in the form of
speculators selling a currencywhen it isstrong. Amoreextreme viewis
that there is a bandwagon effect: at each point during the 1980—814 period,
the appreciation of the dollar against the yen generated expectations of
further futur appreciation, notwithstanding the fact that the dollar was
selling at a forward discount against the yen.It would follow from this
view that speculators ——again, defined as investors acting on the basis
of expectations of exchange rate changes—— drove the yen/dollar rate to a
higher level than would have otherwise prevailed. It would follow that
speculators have exaggerated the reverse swing in 1985—86 as well. Whether
expectations are stabilizing or destabilizing in this sense is one of the
questions examined in this paper.—3—
Another question, which would be of particular interest to
policy—makersif' one were to conclude that exchange rates have been
undesirably unstable, is whether government intervention in the foreign
exchange market otters a way of affecting the exchange rate even in the
absence of a change in macroeconomic policy. The question ofwhether
intervention can have an effect, even if sterilized so as to leave the
money supply unchanged, is generally thought to depend on the question
whether yen and dollar assets are imperfect substitutes in investors'
portfolios. Under the special case in which assets are perfect
substitutes, investors will be willing to absorb indefinitely—large
quantities into their portfolios, as long as the assets pay the going rate
of return, with no effect on the price of the asset. The condition one
would like to test is uncovered interest parity: risk—neutral investors
drive the yen interest rate into equality with the dollar interest rate
corrected for expected depreciation.
Exchange rate expectations are crucial for each of these
important questions, and for others as well. Measuring investors'
expectations is always difficult. Probably the most commonly—used measure
of expected depreciation is the forward discount, which arbitrage (in the
absence of barriers to capital flows) in turn equates to the interest
differential. But using the forward discount or interest differential
prejudgesthe question of perfect substitutability. The other common
approach is to assume that market expectations can be measured as the
mathematical expectation of the realized exchange rate within the sample—4—
period,conditional on some particular information set. But this approach,
too, prejudges much.
Thispaper proposes a third measure, survey data on exchange rate
expectations, to answer various questions of interest regarding the
yen/dollarmarket. The data come from three sources. The American Express
Bank Review surveys 250—300 central bankers, private bankers, corporate
treasurers, and economists once a year, with some surveys going back to
1976. The Economist's Financial Report has conducted telephone surveys of
currency traders and currency—room economists at 14 leading international
banks each six weeks since June 1981. Money Market Services, Inc. (MMS),
has also been surveying approximately 30 currency traders by telephone
every two weeks since January 1953, and every week sInce October 19811.
These data are discussed and analyzed in Frankel and Froot (1985) and Froot
and Frankel (1986). The results reported in the present paper are new,
in two respects. First, they focus exclusively on the yen/dollar rate,
where the earlier two papers examined simultaneously the yen, pound, mark,
French franc, and Swiss franc. Secondly, they distinguish between
short—term expectations on the one hand——at horizons of one week, two weeks
or one month——as reported in the MMS survey, and long—term expectations on
the other hand——at horizons of six months or twelvemonths——as reported in
theother two surveys. The short—term and long—term expectations turn out
to behave very differently.
3The first paper investigates how investors form expectations from the
contemporaneous spot rate and other variables. The second paper
investigates the standard regression equation of exchange rate changes
against the forward discount. Both papers include tests of the proposition
that the expectations measured in the survey are unbiased.—5—
In section 2 we relate expected depreciation as measured by the
surveys to theforward discount, in order to testthe hypothesis of
perfect substitutability. In section 3 we investigate some standard models
of expectations formation——distributed lag, adaptive, and regressive
expectations. In each case one motivation is to see if expectations are
stabilizing, versus the alternative of static or even bandwagon
expectations. In each case a second motivation, which we pursue in section
M, is to test whether the expectations formation process is similar to the
process describing the mathematical expectation or the actual spot rate,
that is, whether the expectations are unbiased conditional on the
particular information set. Included here is a test of the proposition
that investors would do better in forming their expectations if they put
more weight on the contemporaneous spot rate and less weit on other
variables. Finally,in section 5 we briefly summarize our findings.
II. The Forward Discount: Risk Premium or Expected Depreciation?
Our first question is whether investors treat assets denominated
in yen and dollars as perfect substitutes. If positions in different
currencies were perfectly substitutable, investors would be indifferent
between holding open positions in foreign assets and selling the assets
forward. This would imply that the forward discount exactly equals the
expected depreciation of the currency:
e k
(1) As =fd tk t—6—
wherefd is the forward discount at term k (the log of the current forward rate
minus the log of the current spot rate) and is the log of the
expected spot rate k periods into the future minus the log of the current
spot rate. On the other hand, if investors need to be rewarded for
exposure to the additional risk or holding an open position in the foreign
currency, they will demand a risk premium in addition to the forward rate:
(2) L5t+k =fd
—rp.
Because both expected depreciation, Ase, and the risk premium,
rp,are unobservable, additional information or assumptions are requiredto
isolatethem. If, for example, we were to assume that realized future spot
rates are unbiased measures of expected spot rates, then we could estimate
expecteddepreciation (and therefore the risk premium) from the time—series
of realized depreciation.M A second method of identification wotild be
to assume the validity of a particular model of investor portfolio
optimization (such as 1-lodrick and Srivastava (198±4) or Frankel (1982)) and
use it to obtain estimates of the risk premium. A third approach, the one
taken in this paper, is to employ survey data on expected depreciation.
While surveys of agents' expectations may in many contexts be less
desirable than data on their actual market behavior, the surveys are direct
estimatesthat donot require us to assume anyparticular model of expected
depreciationor of the risk premium.
Perfect substitutability, or uncovered interest parity (which,given
covered interest parity, is art equivalent condition), is tested for Japan
versus the United States by Ito (198±4) and McKenzie (1986).—7—
- Firstwe look at simple averages over the sample period.
(Below we will consider variation over time.) In Table 1 wepresent the
time—series means for each set of survey data.The results are ordered by
length of forecast horizon, from the shortest—term one—week expectations,
to the longer—term one—year expectations. The surveys cover a wide variet.
of sample periods as well. In the first column, averages of actual
depreciation are reported. During the periods of the one—week and
one-monthKMS surveys, from October 19814 to February 1986, the dollar
depreciatedagainst the yen at an annual rate of 27.5 percent. During the
periodcovered by the three—month IIMS surveys as well as the three, six and
twelvemonth Economist surveys, the rate of depreciation is much smaller.
Column (2) reports corresponding averages of the survey expected
depreciation. The time—series means of realized depreciation perform very
poorly as measures of the investors' expectations reported in the surveys.
In contrast to the considerable swings in the sign and magnitude of average
actual spot rate changes, the survey consistently called for upward
movementsin the value of the yen against the dollar. The expectations are
thesame in sign, but larger in magnitude than the time—series averages of
the forwarddiscountreported in column (3).
Thelast column in table 1 presents the risk premium on dollar—
denominated assets as implied by thesurveys. Strikingly, during both
periodsof appreciation and periods of depreciation the risk premium is
negative.Far from regarding the two assets as perfect substitutes,
investors appear to be willing to sacrifice the substantially higher






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































magnitudes are surprisingly large. In the three—month Economist data, for
example,- respondents expected they could earn an additional 7.99 percent
per annum on assets denominated in yen compared with dollars. It is hard
to justify such large exchange risk premia using the theory of optimal
portfolio choice with conventional estimates of risk—aversion (Frankel
1985, and Mehra and Prescott 1985).
-
Oneexplanation proposed for why investors were willing to hold
dollars at lower expected rates of return is that the United States
provided a "safe haven" from capital controls and other political risks
(for example, Dooley and Isard, 1985; but see Franke]. and Froot, 1986).
Groundsfor this argument seem especially lacking vis—a—vis the yen: Japan
was not directly involved in either the Latin American debt crisis or
concernsof "Europessimism", andthe 1980s have been a period during which
Japanesefinancial markets have been steadily liberalized, if anything
reducing fears of prospective capital controls. Furthermore, only exchange
rate risk should in theory be relevant, not factors relating to the
political jurisdiction of Japan, because the spot and forward rates are
determined offshore in the Euroinarket. But whatever the reason, table 1
suggests that investors distinguish between assets denominated in different
currencies, demanding a higher return on the yen than on dollars. This is
also clear in Figure 1.
While the evidence so far indicates that a risk premium exists,
it is not necessarily evidence that the risk premium varies over time. The
proposition that the risk premium is time-varying rather than constant
comesout ofmost of the conventional empirical literature on the forward- —9—
market, as wu]] as the theury ofoptimizingi]lvestoz-s, and is also a
propertyof models in which sterilized foreign exchange intervention has
important effects.
Thus we would also like to know whether changes in the forward
discount indicate a changing risk premium. This is precisely the type of
time—varying risk premium that the literature testing forward rate unbiasedness
has sought.5 The degree to which changes in the forward discount reflect
changes in the risk premium can be inferred from a regression of expected
depreciation on the forward discount:
(3) óSt+k bfd +E+k
The null hypothesis in equation (3) is that assets are perfect substitutes,
i.e., a=O and b=l. The estimated coefficient, ,convergesin probability to:
e k k bcoy t+k' fd) /var(fd)
k k k =1—[coy(rP fd) /var(fd) J.
Afinding that b is near zero or less than zero is evidence that changes in
the forward discèunt reflect changes in the risk premiwa, while a finding
that b is near one is evidence that such changes in the forward discount
reflect something else, namely equivalent changes in expected depreciation.
The conventional approach to testing equation (2) uses ex post
spot rate changes to infer the behavior of the unobservable market expected
5Fama(1984),Hodrick and Srivastava (1984, 1986) and Froot and Frankel
(1986) discuss whether changes in the forward discount primarily reflect
changes in the risk premium or in expected depreciation.— 10—
depreciation.Under the assumption of rational expectations, the future
spot rate realizations are viewed as noisy measures of investors'
expectations. This noise is assumed to be uncorrelated with the forward
discount, and therefore can be identified with the residual term in
equation (3). Table 2 reports estimates of equation (3), using ex post
changes in the spot rate as the lefthand—side variable.6 All of the
point estimates of b are less than zero! and most are significantly less
than one. The conventional approach would therefore seem to imply that
changes in the forward discount predominantly reflect changes in the risk
premi urn.
Our alternative test of equation (3) uses the survey expected
depreciation on the lefthand side, in place of the actual spot rate change.
The existence of heterogeneous beliefs, the use or the median survey
response, and the lack of perfect synchronization, are reasons to suspect
that the surveys may also be noisy estimates or market expectations. Now
the error term in the regression equation may be interpreted as measurement
error in the surveys. We make the assumption that this measurement error
is random, which is analogous to the assumption of rational expectations
used in the conventional technique above, i.e., that the expectation error
is random..
6A11 of the regre8sions in this paper are estimated using OLS. The
Economostsurveys, MMS one—monthand three—month surveys, and the AMEX
twelve—monthsurveywere conducted at intervals shorter than their
respective forecast horizons. This implies that the error term in equation
(2) is serially correlated even under the null hypothesis. Consistent
estimates of the standard errors were obtained by the usual method of
moments procedure (see Hansen and Hodrick (1980), or Froot and Frankel
(1986) for a more detailed description). For additional information on the
construction of the data sets used in this paper, see the appendix to















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Though thetwo approaches areanalogous,there are several
reasons to prefer the surveys to the actual spot rate data in tests of
equation(3). The firstisthat, underthe hypothesis thatbothactual
spotrates and the surveys contain only the market expectation plus purely
random noise, the noise element in actualspotrate changes turns out to be
much larger than the noise element in the surveys. In Froot and Frankel
(1986, table 3) we report estimates of the variances of actual and survey
expected spot rate changes and find that the former is greater by a factor
of7to 10. This implies that, forany givensample, a more precise
estimate of bmaybe obtainedby using thesurveys. A second reason to
prefer the surveys is that they free us from imposing the restriction that
there are no systematic prediction errors in the sample, a proposition that
we would like to be able to test rather than impose. Such systematic
errors, which the conventional technique must assume away, could occur
because of a failure of rational expectations, or because important events
which affect expectations did not happen to occur a representative number
of times in the sample (the "peso problem"), rendering the ex post
distribution of spat rate changes a biased estimator of the ex ante
distribution.
Tests of equation (3) using the survey data on the lefthand side
are reported in table 3. In each of the seven data sets the estimates of b
are greater than those in table 2. In most cases we cannot reject the
hypothesis that b equals one. In other words, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the survey risk premia reported in table 1 do not vary over












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































exogenousdownward trend during the 1981—85 period, as it would under the
hypothesis that internationalization was causing investors around the world
to become more willing to hold yen. (Figure 1 shows, on the negative axis,
the risk premium on dollars, i.e., the rorward discount or interest
differential minus the expected appreciation of the yen.) In allcases,
however, we can reject the hypothesis of perfect substitutability, a—O and
b=1 jointly. In other words, the risk premium does show up in the constant
term.
To summarize, in Table 3, as in Table 1, it appears that the ex
post depreciation nay be a very poor measure of expected depreciation.
Table3 provides evidence that changes in the forward discount reflect
primarily changes in expected depreciation rather than changes in the risk
premium.
111. Models of Expected DepreciatLDrl
Theresults from the first three tables suggest thatthereis
information on expectations in the surveys which is not contained in either
realized spot rates or forward rates. We may thus gain new insights by
using this datasourceto reexamine several old formulations of exchange
rate expectations thatarestandard to the literature.7
A general framework for testing various specifications of
expectations is to model expectations of the future spot rate as giving
some weight to the contemporaneous spot rate as well as some weight to
other variables In investors' information set. In each case below, our
7The tests reported in this sectionare similarto those reported in Frankel
and Froot (1985) for the dollar against five other currencies. Butthey
did notincludethe results for the shorter—term forecast horizons.— 13—
nullhypothesis will he that of static expectations: investors place a
weight of oneonthecontemporaneous spot—rateand a weight of zero on the
otherinformation,so that expected depreciation is zero. The alternative
hypothesisdepends on the precise variable chosen to represent the "other"
information.Suppose,forexample,thatinvestorsassigna weight of g to
thelagged spot rate andaweight of l—g to the current spot rate in
forming their expectations of the future spot rate:
— (l—g) +
where 3 is the logarithmofthecurrentspot rate. Subtractings from
both sides we have that expected depreciation isproportionalto the
most recent change in the spot rate:
e
g
Wetermthe model in equation (5) extrapo:flive expectations. If
irivestors place positive weight on the lagged spot rate, so that g is
positive, then equation('1) says that investors' expected future spot rate
is a simple distributed lag.On the otherhand, ifinvestorstendto
extrapolatethe most recent change in the spot rate, so thatgis negative,
then equation (5) may be termed "bandwagon" expectations. In this latter
case a current appreciation by itself generates expectations of further
future appreciation. By defining "speculation" as the buying and selling
of yen in response to non—zero expected exchange rate changes, we can— 114—
interpreta finding ofg>Oas implying thatspeculationis stabilizing and
afindingof gCO as implying thatspeculationis destabilizing.
Table II reports regression estimates of equation (5), using the
survey expected depreciation as the lefthand—side variable. The regression
errorcan be interpreted as random measurement error. Under the joint
hypothesis that the mechanism of expectations formation is specified
correctly and that measurement error is random, the parameter estimatesare
consistent.It shouldbe notedthat the joint hypothesis is a particularly
strong assumptionbecause the spotrate appears on the right—hand—side; if
a changeinexpecteddepreciation feeds back to affect both the
contemporaneous spotrateandany elementof the regression error, then the
estimate ofg will bebiased and inconsistent.However this isnota
problem under our null hypothesis that expected depreciationis constant.
The findingsareonceagain ordered by the length of the forecast
horizon. It is itinediately evident that the shorter—term expectations ——
oneweek, two weeks and one month ——allexhibit large and significant
bandwagontendencies:thatis, s<0. In the one—week expectations, for
example, anappreciation of 10 percent in one week generates the
expectation that the spot rate will appreciate another 2.11percent over the
next seven days.
Incontrast with the shorter—term expectations, the longer—term
results all point toward distributed lag expectations, the stabilizing case.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tobe 3ignificantly greaterthanzero.8 The Economist 12 month data,
for example, imply that a current 10 percent appreciation by itself
generates an expectation of 3.11 percent depreciation over the coming 12
months.Thuslonger—termexpectations feature a strongly positive weight
onthe lagged spot rate rather than complete weitt on the contemporaneous
spot rate, and in this sense are stabilizing.
-
Asecond popular specification for the expected future spot rate
is that it is a weighted average of the current spot rate and the
long—run equilibrium spot rate, :
(6) 5tk (1—e) +
orin terms of expected depreciation:
=° —
If® is positive, as, for example, in the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting
model, the spot rate is expected to move in the direction of ;.
Expectations are therefore regressive. Alternatively, a finding of 0 < 0
implies that investors expect the spot rate to move away from the long—run
equil ibri urn.
81n Frankel and Froot. (1956), we correct for the low Durbin—Watson
statistics itt similar regressions using five different currencies (and
those in Tables 6 and 7) using a three—stage least squares estimation
technique which allows for first order serial correlation iTttheresiduals.
The technique is not repeated here since the corrected results obtained in





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table5 presents tests of equation ('1). Estimates of changes in S
were calculated using CPI's to measure changes in the relative price levels
in the United States and Japan, under the assumption of purchasing power
parity (PPP). Once again, there is strong evidence that shorter—term
expectations are formed in a manner different from longer—term expectations.
The shorter forecast horizons all yield estimates of t.nat 0 are negative,
additional evidence that shorter—term speculation may be destabilizing.
Indeed, the 1—week data suggest that the contemporaneous deviation from the
long—run equilibrium is expected on average to grow by 3 percent over the
subsequent seven days. In other words, short—term expectations are -
explosive.What about the longer—term horizons? InFrankel and Froot
(1985)we found a highly significant speed of regressionat the longer—term
horizons. The longer-term estimates of einTable 5 do not, however,
exhibitregressivity for the yen that is as hily significant. Only the
American Express 12—month data, which is available as far back as 1976,
shows an estimate that is significant even at the 10 percent level. It may
be that relative CPI's are not the appropriate indicator of the equilibrium
yen! dollar rate. It has been suggested that due to rapid productivity
growth in Japan, Japanese producers gain in international competitiveness
even to the extent that F?!' is observed to hold. Marston (1986)
demonstrates that even though estimates of real exchange rate changes using
CPIs show real appreciation of the yen against the dollar over the last
decade, estimates using manufactured goods prices give a very different
answer.9
Thefinal specification we consider is adaptive expectations. In











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































thiscase, agents are hypothesized to form their expectation of the future




Expected depreciation is now proportional to the contemporaneous prediction
error:
(9) ts. 'Y —
Table6 reports estimates of equation (9). Once again, the
weight placed on the variable other than the contemporaneous spot rate, in
this case the lagged expectation, is sensitive to the forecast horizon of
the surveys. Shorter—term expectations again appear to be strongly
destabilizing, while the longer—term expectations are significantly
stabilizing. For example, the one—week data indicate that an unanticipated
appreciation of 10 percent by itself generates an expectation of
continued appreciation over the subsequent seven days of 1.3 percent. At
the other extreme, the Economist 12—month data suggest that an
unanticipated appreciation of 10 percent generates an offsetting
expectation of depreciation of 1.5 percent over the subsequent year.
The results of Tables 4, 5, and 6 suggest that in all three of
our standard models of expectations——extrapolative, regressive and
adaptive——short—term and long—term expectations behave very differently— 18—
fromone another. Longer—term expectations consistentlyappear to be
stabilizing, while shorter—term forecasts seem to have adestabilizing
nature. Within each of the above tables, it is as if thereare actually
two models of expectations operating, one at each end of thespectrum of
forecast horizons, and a blend in between.
It may be that each respondent is thinking to himselfor herself,
"1 know that in the long run the exchange rate must returnto the
equilibrium level dictated by fundamentals. But in the short run I will
ride the current trend a little longer. I only have to be carefulto watch
for the turning point and to get out of the market beforeeveryone else
does." If this is the logic of the typical investor, then he isacting
irrationally; it is not possible for everyone to get out beforeeveryone
else. But so far we have not presented any evidence that theactual spot
process behaves differently from investors' expectations. We consider such
evidence in the following section.1°
IV. Rationality of the Survey Expectations
Now that we have a sense for the behavior of thesurvey expected
depreciation, we turn to an analysis of whether the predictablecomponent
100ne possibility is thattheMMSshort—termsurvey is picking up
predominantly the expectations of floor traders, people who buyandsell
currency on a short—term basis, and thattheother two, longer—term,
surveys are picking up predominantly the expectations of investors who have
a longer—term perspective. Under this interpretation, it may be that the
traders have developed the habit of ignoring economic fundamentals in their
expectations formation, rather going with time series trends (as in
"chartism" or "technical analysis"), and that the lattergroup pays more
attention to fundaiaentals. The chartist/fundamentalist dichotomy and its
implications for the determination of the value of the dollar in the 1980s












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ofthe true spot process behaves in the same way, i.e., whether
expectations are rational. One way to proceed would be to re—estimate each
of the models given in equations (5)—(8), only now using realized
depreciation as the lefthand—side variable. The hypothesis that
expectations are rational would imply that these regressions should yield
coefficients that are statistically indistinguishable from those obtained
earlier using the surveys on the lefthand aide. A more direct way to test
the same hypothesis is to regress the difference between the survey
expectation and the actual future spot rate, the survey prediction error,
on each set of regressors in equations (5)-(3). Under the null hypfthesis
that expectations are rational, this prediction error should be purely
random (conditionally independent of all information available at time t)
and therefore should be uncorrelated both with the righthand—side variables
and with past errors. We test whether the coefficients are jointly zero.
Table 7 reports regressions of the survey prediction errors on
the most recent change in the spot rate. The estimated F statistics give
some evidence of systematic expectational errors: five of the nine data
sets reject the joint hypothesis that both the constant and slope
coefficients equal zero. In view of the discussion in the previous
section, an inspection of the slope coefficient, g, can help us to
determine whether investors place the correct weight on the lagged spot
rate. A finding of g1>O would indicate that expectations are
"insufficiently" extrapolative: investors give too much weight to the
lagged spot rate and too little weight to the contemporaneous spot rate




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































thatexpectations are"overly" extrapolative.Table 7suggeststhat
predictionsat the shorter forecasthorizons tend to be overly
extrapolative,while those at the longer horizoha are insufficiently
extrapolative. Such a pattern suggests that the contrast in Table 5
between the behavior of short—term and long—term expectations is too
extremerelative to what the actual process generating spot rate changes
would predict. Few estimates ofZi'however, are significantly different
fromzero. There is thus not enough evidence so far to conclude that, at
any of the reported forecast horizons, investors place too little or too
much weight on the lagged spot rate relative to what is rational.
In Table 8 we test whether investors' expectations give the
correct weight to the long—run equilibrium spot rate1 L Here the
resultsare surprisingly consistent across all of the forecast horizons:
expectations seem to be insufficiently regressive in that they give less
weight to §,andtherefore more weight to the contemporaneous spot rate,
than does the true process governing the behavior of the spot rate. In
Table 9 we performthe analogous test using lagged expectational errors on
the righthand side. In this case, the alternative hypotheses are that
expectations are either overly or insufficiently adaptive. As in Table 7,
the results in Table 9 do not suggest any clear tendency on the part of
investors to give too much or too little weitlt to the most recent
expectational prediction error.
The tests of rational expectations presented so far in Tables
7—9areappropriate when we take as given the specific models of
expectationsformation discussed in the previous section. Each regression— 21 —
wasdesigned to test whether investors assign the correct weit to a
single element in their information set when predicting the level of the
yen/dollar rate. If, however, both expectations and thetrue spotprocess
depend on other unspecified infornation, then the above tests of
rationality are not necessarily the most enlightening nor the most powerful.
A more robust testwouldask whether expectations assign too little weight
to the contemporaneous spot rate and (by default) too muchweight to all
other variables in their information set. This test is performedby
regressing the survey prediction error on the survey expected depreciation:
(10) :+k—5tk a + bt+k —s)+ttk'
-
andtesting the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero. The
alternative hypothesis is that investors place too much (or too little)
weight on variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate relative to
what is rational. Following Bilson (1981), we term this alternative
hypothesis "excessive speculation", because investors could improve their
forecasts by consistently reducing toward zero their expectations of
depreciation.
Table 10 reports our estimates of equation (10). Here we find
much more evidence of systematic expectational errors in thesurveys. All
but oneof the data sets reject the hypothesis thattheconstant and slope
parameter arejointlyzero. Four of the seven estimates of b are also
statistically different from zero, so there is considerable evidence of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rationality,our estimates here are uniformly positive and do notappear
related to the length of forecast horizon. Inevery case we are also
unable to reject the hypothesis that b—i, which wouldimply that the
expectations contain no useful information at all as to the future spot
rate, i.e., that the spot rate follows a random walk.
-Wementioned earlier the possibility of measurement error in the
survey data. In any of the regression equations where the expectations
variable appears only on the lefthand side, namely the cases of
extrapolative expectations (Tables 14 and 7) and regressive expecations
(Tables 5 and 8) random measurement error does notimpair the regression
estimates. But in the case of adaptive expectations (Tables ô and9). as
well as in the present case of excessive speculation (Table 10), the
expectations variable appears also on the righthand side of the equation,
so that measurement error would affect the estimates.
When the issue of possible random measurement error in these
regression equations is addressed the results are qualitatively unchanged.
In the test for excessive speculation we can eliminate theproblem of
measurement error (so long as it is random) by using the forward discount
as the righthand—side variable. Table 11 again shows systematic
expectational errors: investors could do better by routinely betting
against the forward discount,11
11See Froot and Frankel (1986) for furtherexplanation. In the case of
estimating adaptive expectations, we would argue that the bias introduced,
though nonzero, is small, because the variance of actual spot rate changes



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) The survey data on exchange rateexpectations appear to contain new
information about market expectations which isnot apparent from either ex
post spot rate changes or the forward discount. Our measures showthat,
despite the large swings in both directions in the value of theyen since
1980, the surveys consistently called for a largeappreciation of the yen
against the dollar.
(2) These measures of expectedappreciation are also substantially in
excess of the forward pre!tiu.'n.An implication is that investors were
wiiitg to accept a lower expected rateof return on dollar assets than on
comparable asseta denominated in yen.
(3)Contraryto what is commonly assumed in mostmodels in which
Sterilized foreign exchange intervention isefrective, variation in the
forward discowfl does not reflect astatistically significant degree of
variation in the risk premium.
(14) Variation in the forward disc6untprimarily reflects, instead of
changes in the risk premiwn, changes in expecteddepreciation.
(5) The expectations given in the short—ternsurveys exhibit bandwagon
effects, which could imply that short—termspeculation is destabilizing.
(6) Expectations at longer—term horizcns, inccntrast, appear to put less
than full weight on the contemporaneousspc: r: and positive weight on24 —
severalother variables such as the lagged spot rate, the long—run
equilibrium spot rate, and the lagged expected spot rate.
(7) Investors could improve both their short—term and their long—term
forecasts by reducing the absolute magnitude of expected depreciation
toward zero. This finding of "excessive speculation" would also follow
from the result that expected depreciation is not zero together with the
popular hypothesis that the true spot process follows a random walk.— 25—
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